The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions by Campbell, Rutheford B, Jr.
University of Kentucky
UKnowledge
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles Law Faculty Publications
8-2011
The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and
Bad) Outcomes for the SEC’s Crown Jewel
Exemptions
Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.
University of Kentucky College of Law, rcampbel@uky.edu
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rutherford B Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66
Bus. Law. 919 (2011).
The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended
(and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC's Crown Jewel
Exemptions
By Rutheford B Campbell, Jr *
Regulation D is-or at least should be-the crown jewel of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's regulatory exemptions from the registration requirements of the Se-
curities Act of 1933. It offers businesses-especially businesses with relatively small capital
requirements-fair and efficient access to vital, external capital.
In this article, I present data derived from deep samples of recent Form Ds filed with the
Commission. The data show that Regulation D is not working in the way the Commission
intended or in a way that benefits society The data reveal that companies attempting to
raise relatively small amounts of capital under Regulation D overwhelmingly forego the low
transaction costs of offerings under Rule 504 and Rule 505 in favor of meeting the more
onerous (and more expensive) requirements of Rule 506. Additionally, these companies over-
whelmingly limit their relatively small offerings to accredited investors, which dramatically
reduces the pool of potential investors.
This unintended and bad outcome is the result of the burdens imposed by state blue sky
laws and regulations, and this has to a large degree wrecked the sensible and balanced ap-
proach of the Commission in Regulation D.
Reclaiming Regulation D requires the elimination of state authority over all Regula-
tion D offerings. State regulators, however have proven to be aggressive and effective in
protecting their turf. Although the Commission has the ability-and I believe the duty-to
solve this problem for the benefit of the economy, it has a history of an unwillingness to
take on state regulators, even in instances where state regulations essentially destroy the
Commission's sensible and balanced regime for capital formation. Congress also could
solve the problem by expanding federal preemption to cover all offerings made under
Regulation D.
Contents
1. Introduction.. ................................. ............ 920
II. Overview of Regulation D...................... ........... 923
*James and Mary Lassiter Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author is
indebted to David M. Cameron and Kimberly Coghill for their assistance in the preparation of this
article.
919
920 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 66, August 2011
IlI. Data: The Wreck of the Commission's
Regulation D Exemptions ................................. 926
A. The Marginalization of Rule 504 and Rule 505 ............ ......... 926
B. Regulation D Offerings Limited to Accredited Investors ..... ..... 929
C. Financial Intermediation in Regulation D Offerings ....... ....... 930
IV The Data: Interpretations, Inferences, and Conclusions ....... ....... 931
A. The Underuse of Rule 504 and Rule 505; Limiting
Offerings to Accredited Investors. ......................... 931
B. Why Companies Abandon Rule 504 and Rule
505 and Limit Offerings to Accredited Investors ............... 932
C. Pernicious Effects ........................... ......... 933
V The Prescription ............................................... 936
A. History of the Problem.................................936
B. Remedial Action(s) ................................... 940
VI. Conclusion .................................................. 942
1. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission")
adopted Regulation D,' which offered businesses, especially small businesses, at-
tractive exemptions from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
1933 ("Securities Act"). These exemptions were carefully crafted by the Commis-
sion and informed by the considerable experience the Commission had acquired
in connection with its earlier, somewhat problematic rules-Rule 240,2 Rule 242,1
and Rule 146.4
The Commission's experience with those prior rules and some not so gentle
nudging by commentators5 seemingly convinced the Commission that sensible
and successful exemptions from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act
must strike an acceptable balance between investor protection and capital forma-
tion.' Regulation D adopted this idea.
1. See 17 C.ER. H§ 230.501-508 (2010). The rules were adopted in Revisions of Certain Exemp-
tions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No.
33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11251 (Apr. 14, 1982) (codified at 17 C.ER. pts. 230 & 239). Regulation D
now consists of Rules 501 through 508. Rules 501 through 503 and Rules 507 through 508 are general
rules of support for the exemptions found in Rules 504 through 506.
2. 17 C.ER. § 230.240 (1981). Rule 240 provided an exemption from registration under section
3(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b), for offerings of up to $100,000.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242 (1981). Rule 242 provided an exemption from registration under section
3(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b), for offerings of up to $2 million.
4. 17 C.ER. § 230.146 (1981). Rule 146 provided an exemption from registration under section
4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2), for offerings unlimited in amount.
5. See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act of 1933:
Practical Foreclosure from the Capital Market, 1977 DUKE LJ. 1139 (1978) [hereinafter Campbell, The
Plight of Small Issuers] (describing the ambiguity of Rule 146, the problems created by the integration
provisions of that rule, and the difficulty of reselling securities acquired in offerings exempt under
Rule 146).
6. Former Rule 146 was especially unbalanced in this regard. See id. at 1143-57. Later, Congress
specifically instructed the Commission regarding the obligation to balance investor protection and
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With regard to investor protection, Regulation D was based on the correct
assumption that the two most potent protections for investors are their own
sophistication-their ability to evaluate the merits and risks of any offering of
securities-and the meaningful disclosure of or access to material investment
information.' With regard to capital formation, Regulation D was based on the
correct assumptions that transaction costs (offering costs) can throttle capital for-
mation and that it is relative, not absolute, offering costs that are important in
that regard."
Regulation D, therefore, offered issuers a stair-step approach through its
three exemptions-Rule 504, Rule 505, and Rule 506-requiring more inves-
tor protections as the size of the offering increased. The apparent reckoning
of the Commission was that the investor protection devices-disclosure and
sophistication requirements-generate significant transaction costs for issuers,
and since relative rather than absolute transaction costs choke off capital for-
mation, a sensible balance between capital formation and investor protection
leads to the imposition of additional investor protection requirements as deals
get larger.
Accordingly, Rule 504 provides an exemption from registration for offerings
up to $1 million9 without any purchaser sophistication requirement or disclosure
requirement.'o Rule 505, which provides an exemption for offerings up to $5 mil-
lion, requires the issuer in most cases to disclose investment information to the
purchasers." Rule 506, which provides an exemption without any amount limita-
tion, requires the issuer in most cases to make even more extensive disclosures
of investment information 2 and generally limits purchasers to sophisticated or
accredited investors."
The Commission deserves high praise for its enactment of Regulation D. Even
if one is unsure that each balance struck by the Commission in Regulation D was
precisely correct, the underlying theory was sensible, and the regulation amounts
to a good-faith and generally sound application of that theory by an experienced
and respected regulatory agency' 4
capital formation. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006) ("the Commission shall also consider, in addition to
the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation").
7. See infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
9. As originally enacted, Rule 504 offered an exemption for offerings up to $500,000. See 17
C.ER. § 230.504(b)(2)(i) (1983).
10. 17 C.ER. H§ 230.504(b), 230.502(b)(1) (2010).
11. Id. H§ 230.505, 230.502(b)(1). Rule 505, however, does not require disclosure of investment
information in the case of sales to accredited investors. Id. § 230.502(b)(1).
12. Id. § 230.506. Rule 506, however, does not require disclosure of investment information in the
case of sales to accredited investors. Id. § 230.502(b)(1).
13. Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
14. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers (and Others) Under Regulation D: Those
Nagging Problems that Need Attention, 74 Ky. L.). 127, 135 (1985) ("The problem with Regulation D ...
is not the underlying fundamental philosophy of the rules, but, instead, is the implementation of that
philosophy").
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A number of events or circumstances since 1982, however, have reshaped the
environment in which Regulation D operates and, as a result, have to a large
extent wrecked Regulation D. Data demonstrate that small issuers raising small
amounts of capital now overwhelmingly abandon Rule 504 and Rule 505. Offer-
ings of securities eligible to use those exemptions are now by a very large majority
made under Rule 506 and limited to accredited investors.15
This unintended outcome is the result of state securities laws, specifically states'
registration requirements in their blue sky laws.'6
In 1996, Congress enacted the National Securities Markets Improvement Act
("NSMIA"),"7 which preempted state authority over the registration of securities
offered under Rule 506.11 NSMIA did not, however, preempt state authority over
offerings made under Rule 504 and Rule 505.19 It is this distinction regarding pre-
emption of state blue sky laws that causes issuers to abandon Rule 504 and Rule
505 and restructure these small offerings as compliant with Rule 506 and limited
to accredited investors.
In short, state blue sky laws have wrecked the sensible, balanced, and efficient
regime that the Commission enacted in Regulation D. What is interesting and,
indeed, unfortunate for small issuers and the economy generally is that the Com-
mission, which acted so appropriately in the construction of Regulation D, has
without even a whimper of protest permitted the beneficial effects of Regulation
D to be largely neutralized in this manner, making it more difficult for issuers,
especially small issuers, to find the capital they need to do business.
In this article I offer data demonstrating the evolution of Regulation D into a
regime that the Commission neither intended nor anticipated. The data, taken
from deep samples of recent Form D filings, show that issuers relying on the
exemptions provided by Regulation D, no matter the size of their offering, over-
whelmingly offer their securities pursuant to the terms of Rule 506 and limit their
offering to accredited investors. The data demonstrate the marginalization of Rule
15. Regulation D defines "accredited investor" to include both "[a]ny natural person whose indi-
vidual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds
$1,000,000" and "[any natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each
of the two most recent years or joint income with that person's spouse in excess of $300,000 in each
of those years and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year."
17 CER. § 230.501(a)(5), (a)(6) (2010). The net worth test for an accredited investor was recently
amended to exclude the value of the investor's primary residence. See infra note 105 and accompany-
ing text.
16. These state laws and the regulations enacted thereunder require issuers offering their securities
in a particular state either to register the securities with the state's division of securities or to meet the
requirements for an exemption from the particular state's registration requirement. See, e.g., UNiF. SEC.
Act § 301, 7C U.L.A. 74 (2002) ("It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any securities in this state
unless (1) it is registered or (2) the security or transaction is exempted under section 402.").
17. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2006)) [hereinafter NSMIA].
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1)(A) & (b)(4)(D) (2006).
19. Rule 504 and Rule 505 are enacted under section 3(b) of the 1933 Act. See 17 C.ER.
H§ 230.504(a), 230.505(a) (2010). Securities offered under exemptions enacted under section 3(b) are
not "covered securities" and thus not subject to preemption. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r(b) (West 2009 &
Supp. 2011).
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504 and Rule 505 and the consequent destruction of the fundamental regime
originally constructed by the Commission in Regulation D.
This is, I argue, an unintended outcome and, even more importantly, a bad out-
come. Small businesses are a vital part of our national economy and face formi-
dable structural and economic obstacles when they search for external capital. It is
unfair and bad national policy to allow state blue sky laws effectively to foreclose
or significantly limit these businesses and entrepreneurs from efficient access to
external capital. Indeed, such an outcome is also inconsistent with the articulated
congressional preference for capital formation rules that sensibly balance investor
protection and capital formation.20
To reclaim Regulation D the Commission must more closely monitor the vast
data available to them in Form Ds filed by issuers utilizing Regulation D. Such
oversight is essential if sensible adjustments in the regulation are to be made as
conditions change. The Commission must also have the courage to take the af-
firmative action to neutralize the pernicious effects on Regulation D caused by
state blue sky laws.
II. OVERVIEW OF REGULATION D
In 1974, the Commission adopted Rule 1461 and thus began a decade of regu-
latory activity regarding what roughly may be called private placements.22 Rule
146, however, was an inauspicious beginning for the Commission.23 The Rule's
20. As a part of NSMIA, Congress specifically ordered the Commission to follow such a balanced
approach in instances when the Commission's delegated authority to enact rules was to be exercised
in furtherance of the "public interest." See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006) ("Whenever ... the Commission
is engaged in rule making and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.").
21. Rule 146 was adopted by the Commission in Transactions by an Issuer Deemed Not to Involve
Any Public Offering, Securities Act Release No. 5487, 4 SEC Docket 154, 1974 WL 161966 (Apr. 23,
1974). The rule became effective June 10, 1974.
22. Prior to the adoption of Rule 146, private placements were limited to offerings under the com-
mon law that had developed around section 4(2) of the 1933 Act. Although the exemption provided
by section 4(2) of the 1933 Act was widely utilized by issuers prior to the Commission's administrative
rules regarding private offerings, the exemption was widely criticized for its ambiguity See, e.g., Royall
Victor, Jr. & Melvin L. Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards for the Unwary, 45 VA. L. REV. 869, 869 (1959)
(characterizing section 4(2) as "probably the most frequently used of all the exemptions, either con-
sciously or unconsciously"); see also Edward T. McDermott, The Private Offering Exemption, 59 IowA L.
REv. 525, 549 (1974) (characterizing the exemption as "a tale of growing confusion"); Julian M. Meer,
The Private Offering Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act-A Study in Administrative and Judicial
Contraction, 20 Sw. L.J. 503, 534 (1966) (characterizing use of the exemption for non-institutional
offerees as "a hazardous risk").
23. See Homer Kripke, SEC Rule 146: A "Major Blunder" N.Y. L.J., July 5, 1974, at 1, col. 2; Robert
A. Kessler, Private Placement Rules 146 and 240-Safe Harbor?, 44 FoRDHAM L. REv. 37 (1975); Robert
H. Kinderman, Jr., The Private Offering Exemption: An Examination of Its Availability Under and Outside
Rule 146, 30 Bus. LAw. 921 (1975); Ellsworth A. Weinberg & Michael W McManus, The Private Place-
ment Exemption Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 Revisited, and Rule 146, 27 BAYLOR L. REv.
201 (1975); H. David Heumann, Is Rule 146 Too Subjective to Provide the Needed Predictability in Private
Offerings?, 55 NEB. L. REv. 1, 9 (1975).
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requirements were so burdensome and expensive that the exemption was often
practically unavailable, especially for small offerings by small issuers. 24
Responding to the special problems that small businesses had in meeting the
conditions of Rule 146, the Commission in 1975 adopted Rule 240, which offered
an exemption from registration to small companies selling up to $100,000 of their
securities.25 Then in 1978 the Commission enacted Rule 242,26 which provided
an exemption from registration for offerings up to $500,000. The requirements
for a Rule 242 exemption were more onerous than those of Rule 240 but signifi-
cantly less burdensome (and expensive) than the requirements of Rule 146.27
In 1982, the Commission adopted Regulation D.28 The new regulation amounted
to a consolidated and much improved version of those prior three rules. Roughly,
new Rule 504, Rule 505, and Rule 506 replaced, respectively, old Rule 240, Rule
242, and Rule 146.
Today's Regulation D differs little from the original version of that regulation
adopted in 1982.29 Over the nearly thirty-year history of Regulation D, the Com-
mission has held to its fundamental underlying principle of balancing investor
protection and capital formation, continuing to recognize that relatively high
transaction costs can choke off valuable capital formation.
Briefly, today's Rule 504 exemption, which is limited to non-reporting com-
panies, permits a non-1934 Act company to offer up to $1 million in securities
in a twelve-month period.30 There are no disclosure requirements or offeree or
24. See Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers, supra note 5, at 1143-57.
25. See 17 C.ER. § 230.240 (1976). Rule 240 was adopted in Exemption of Certain Limited Of-
fers and Sales by Closely Held Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 5560, 6 SEC Docket 132, 1975 WL
160968 (Jan. 24, 1975). In the adopting release, the Commission stated that the exemption was for
small issuers "where, because of the small size and limited character of the offering, the public benefits
of registration are too remote." 1975 WL 160968, at * 1.
26. See 17 C.ER. § 230.242 (1980). Rule 242 was adopted in Exemption of Limited Offers and
Sales by Qualified Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6180, 19 SEC Docket 295, 1980 WL 29335 (Jan.
17, 1980).
27. For example, unlike the requirements of Rule 240, the exemption provided by Rule 242 required
disclosure of investment information (in addition to other requirements). 17 C.ER. § 230.242(c)-(h)
(1979).
28. Today's version of Regulation D is found at 17 C.ER. 9§ 230.501-508 (2010). In early 1978,
the Commission announced the hearings that led to the adoption of Regulation D. Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5914,43 Fed. Reg. 10876 (Mar. 15, 1978). Regulation D became effective on April 15, 1982.
See Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and
Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11251, 11251 (Mar. 8, 1982).
29. There are, of course, some differences. For example, as originally adopted, Rule 504 provided
an exemption only for offerings of up to $500,000, while today that limit has been raised to $1 mil-
lion. Compare 17 C.ER. § 230.504(b)(2)(i) (1983), with 17 C.ER. § 230.504(b)(2)(i) (2010). Also, for
example, as originally adopted, one of the accredited investor standards was based on "individual in-
come in excess of $200,000," while today that test has been expanded to include a test based on one's
"joint income with that person's spouse in excess of $300,000." Compare 17 C.ER. § 230.501(a)(7)
(1983), with 17 C.ER. § 230.501(a)(6) (2010). Also, the net worth standard for an accredited investor
has recently been amended. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
But, as the following textual discussion demonstrates, the fundamental requirements and, most
certainly, the philosophy of Regulation D have been unchanged over that period.
30. 17 C.FR. § 230.504(b)(2) (2010).
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purchaser qualification requirements. The Rule imposes no limitation on the
number of purchasers that may acquire securities in a Rule 504 offering. The is-
suer is prohibited from engaging in any general advertising in connection with the
offering and must take steps to ensure that there is no public resale of the securi-
ties for a period of time."
Rule 505, which is available to both reporting and non-reporting companies,
offers issuers an exemption for offerings of up to $5 million, but it conditions the
availability of the exemption on the issuer's meeting additional conditions, the
most significant of which is the requirement that the issuer, prior to sale, provide
each unaccredited purchaser a significant amount of closely prescribed narrative
and financial investment information. 32 An additional condition in Rule 505, as
compared to Rule 504, is a limit of thirty-five unaccredited purchasers. 3 Simi-
lar to Rule 504, Rule 505 prohibits any general advertising of the offering and
requires that the issuer take steps to prevent any public resale of the securities
acquired in a Rule 505 offering.34
Rule 506 is available to reporting and non-reporting companies and imposes
no amount limitation on the issuer's offering.35 Like Rule 505, it predicates the
availability of the exemption on the issuer's supplying closely prescribed narra-
tive and financial investment information to all unaccredited purchasers, and the
amount of this information increases as the size of the offering gets larger.3 6 Rule
506, however, enhances the required investor protection, as compared to Rule
505, by requiring that each purchaser be either sophisticated or accredited.3 7 Like
Rule 505, Rule 506 prohibits general advertising, requires that the issuer take
steps to prevent any public resales of the securities acquired in a Rule 506 offer-
ing, and limits that number of unaccredited purchasers to thirty-five.3 8
To reiterate, the underlying theory of Regulation D-imposing additional inves-
tor protection requirements as transactions get larger-makes perfect sense as an
appropriate balance of the important, competing policies of promotion of capital
formation and investor protection. 39 Certainly it was rational at the time of adop-
tion to anticipate that Regulation D would work as planned-that small offerings
would utilize Rule 504, that somewhat larger offerings would utilize Rule 505, and
that the largest private offerings would utilize Rule 506. Regulation D appeared to
offer a strong incentive for small issuers-and there are literally millions of them
with needs for external capital 4 -to flock to Rule 504, with its minimal require-
ments and the resulting low transaction costs. For the same reasons-relatively
31. Id. § 230.504(b)(1).
32. Id. § 230.505(b).
33. Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii).
34. Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(iii).
35. See id. § 230.506.
36. Id. § 230.506(b)(1).
37. Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
38. Id. § 230.506(b).
39. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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lower transaction costs-it was rational to assume that small issuer offerings of
$1 million to $5 million would utilize Rule 505 instead of Rule 506. The economic
incentives built into Regulation D seemed certain to ensure that the stepped ap-
proach of Regulation D would work in a manner consistent with the Commission's
obligation to offer exemptions from registration that balance the need for investor
protection with the need to encourage capital formation.
As the next part of this article demonstrates, however, the actual outcome has
been dramatically different from the Commission's intended outcome and its ob-
ligation to promote capital formation with its rules.
III. DATA: THE WRECK OF THE COMMISSION'S
REGULATION D EXEMPTIONS
Data demonstrate the failure of Regulation D to achieve the Commission's goals,
especially the goal of promoting efficient capital formation for small businesses.
A. THE MARGINALIZATION OF RULE 504 AND RULE 505
Tables I through IV, which follow, provide data from approximately 27,000
Form Ds filed between September 15, 2008, and October 18, 2010.1 Data from
this deep sample of Form Ds show that Regulation D offerings overwhelmingly
are made under Rule 506. Even offerings of $1 million or less-offerings that are
suited for Rule 504-are overwhelmingly made under Rule 506. Similarly, the
data show offerings of $1 million to $5 million-offerings that are suited for Rule
505-are also overwhelmingly made under Rule 506.
Consider first Table I, immediately below, which shows the percentage and
number of Regulation D offerings in our sample that were made under Rule 504,
Rule 505, and Rule 506.
Table I
Regulation D Regulation D Regulation D
Offerings Under Offerings Under Offerings Under
Rule 504 Rule 505 Rule 506
Percentage 4.4% 1.6% 94.0%
Number 1,196/27,234 447/27,234 25,591/27,234
Combined, offerings under Rule 504 and Rule 505 amounted to a mere 6 per-
cent of all Regulation D offerings, and upon first consideration, this modest use
of Rule 504 and Rule 505 and the overwhelming reliance on Rule 506 seem cu-
rious. The data in Table I become even more difficult to understand in light of
41. Regulation D data were obtained from the subscription-only Knowledge Mosaic website. See
Form D Data, KNOWLEDGE MosAic, www.knowledgemosaic.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) (follow
"Form D" hyperlink; then search "Form D"). Form D filings claiming multiple Regulation D exemp-
tions were not included in the data reported in this article.
The Wreck of Regulation D 927
the number of small businesses in this country and the need these firms have for
external capital.
Data from the Small Business Administration ("SBA"),42 for example, show that
there are nearly five million businesses in the United States that employ fewer
than twenty individuals." This amounts to almost 90 percent of the total busi-
ness units in the United States." SBA data4 5 also indicate that nearly 5,500,000
business firms have fewer than 100 employees, which amounts to slightly over
98 percent of the total business units in the United States.46 It is, of course, these
millions of small businesses that were the intended beneficiaries of the Commis-
sion's Rule 504 and Rule 505.
Not surprisingly, the data indicate that these smaller firms require external capi-
tal in order to compete in the marketplaces in which they operate. For example,
approximately 90 percent of small firms rely on external debt for financing.47
A closer look at the data from our sample of Form Ds, however, demonstrates that
smaller firms are indeed utilizing Regulation D for their small capital requirements.
Consider in that regard Table II, immediately below, which groups Regulation D
offerings by size. Table II shows both the percentage and number of Regulation D
offerings from our sample that were $1 million or less and the percentage and num-
ber of Regulation D offerings that were between $1 million and $5 million.
Table II
Regulation D Offerings of Regulation D Offerings of
$1 Million or Less $1 Million to $5 Million
Percentage 28.9% 25.9%
Number 7,880/27,234 7,059/27,234
Table 11 indicates that approximately 55 percent of the Regulation D offerings in
our 27,000 sample were for amounts of $5 million or less. Offerings of $1 million
42. See, e.g., U.S. SMALL BuS. ADMIN., THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1999-
2000 (2001) [hereinafter THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 20001. Earlier SBA data do not differ materially
from later data. See, e.g., U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
1994 (1995) [hereinafter THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1994].
43. THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 42, at 61 tbl. A.4 (in 1998, 4,988,367 firms in
America had less than twenty employees).
44. See id. (in 1998, 89.4 percent of all firms in America had less than twenty employees).
45. Data demonstrating the significance of small business to our economy can also be found in
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1999, at 545 tbl. 861 (119th ed. 1999)
(84.6 percent of all business tax returns filed for 1980 were filed by entities with less than $1 million
in receipts); id. at 555 tbl. 874 (in 1980, 22.3 percent of total national payroll came from firms with
fewer than twenty employees, and 47.5 percent of total national payroll that year came from firms with
fewer than 100 employees).
46. See THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 42, at 61 rbl. A.4 (in 1998, firms employing
less than 100 employees accounted for 98.3 percent of all firms in the United States).
47. See THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1994, supra note 42, at 167 tbl. 5.15 (in 1993, 88.7 percent of
firms with ten to nineteen employees and 91.1 percent of firms employing between twenty and ninety-
nine persons relied on external credit as a form of financing).
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or less-offerings that were within the Rule 504 permissible range-accounted
for approximately 29 percent of the Regulation D offerings in our sample, and
offerings of $1 million to $5 million-offerings that were within the Rule 505
permissible range-accounted for approximately 26 percent of the Regulation D
offerings in our sample.
Tables III and IV reconcile what appear to be inconsistent data from Tables I
and II, demonstrating that issuers offering securities under Regulation D in the
permissible ranges of Rule 504 and Rule 505 overwhelmingly effected those of-
ferings under Rule 506.
Table III shows the percentage and number of Regulation D offerings of $1 mil-
lion or less that were made under Rule 504 and Rule 506.
Table III
Regulation D Offerings of Regulation D Offerings
$1 Million or Less of $1 Million or Less
Offered Under Rule 504 Offered Under Rule 506
Percentage 14.3% 78.6%
Number 1,125/7,880 6,196/7,880
The data in Table III show that small issuers offering small amounts of securities
under Regulation D overwhelmingly abandoned Rule 504, which is the Regula-
tion D exemption especially formulated by the Commission to provide fair and
efficient access to capital for small businesses. Instead, these small issuers by a
large majority relied on Rule 506, with its more onerous and expensive offering
requirements.
Table IV shows the percentage and number of Regulation D offerings between
$1 million and $5 million that were made under Rule 505 and Rule 506.
Table IV
Regulation D Offerings of Regulation D Offerings of
$1 Million to $5 Million $1 Million to $5 Million
Offered Under Rule 505 Offered Under Rule 506
Percentage 3.9% 91.9%
Number 276/7,059 6,487/7,059
The data demonstrate, once again, that smaller companies fail to take advan-
tage of the low transaction costs of Rule 505. As was the case with offerings of $1
million or less, these small businesses overwhelmingly rely on Rule 506, with its
more onerous and expensive offering requirements.
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B. REGULATION D OFFERINGS LIMITED TO ACCREDITED INVESTORS
Tables V through VIII, which are based on a sample of 1,000 Form D filings
made between September 15, 2010, and October 12, 2010," show that Regula-
tion D has largely become an exemption under which offerings are made exclu-
sively to accredited investors. Most important for this article is Table VIII, which
shows that issuers offering a small amount of securities under Regulation D (of-
ferings in amounts that could take advantage of Rule 504 and Rule 505) are over-
whelmingly limiting their search for external capital to accredited investors.
Table V immediately below shows the percentage and number of all Regulation
D offerings in our sample that were made exclusively to accredited investors.
Table V
Regulation D Offerings Limited
to Accredited Investors
Percentage 88.5%
Number 885/1,000
Table VI provides additional information about the Regulation D offerings in
Table V, separating those offerings into offerings made under Rule 504, Rule 505,
and Rule 506.
* Table VI
Rule 504 Rule 505 Rule 506
Offerings Limited Offerings Limited Offerings Limited
to Accredited to Accredited to Accredited
Investors Investors Investors
Percentage 59.3% 56.5% 91.2%
Number 35/59 13/23 837/918
Table VI, however, does not accurately reflect the extent to which small offer-
ings are limited to accredited investors. This is because, as described earlier in
connection with the data in Table III and Table IV, a large percentage of the offer-
ings within the range of Rule 504 ($1 million or less) and the range of Rule 505
($1 million to $5 million) are made under Rule 506.
48. A sample of 1,000 Regulation D filings was obtained from SEC filings in September and Octo-
ber of 2010. See Form D Data, KNOWLEDGE MOSAlc, http://www.knowledgemosaic.com (last visited Apr.
1, 2011) (follow "Form D" hyperlink; then search "Form D"; and search Filing Date Range beginning
on 9/15/2010 and ending on 10/12/2010). The manner in which Mosaic collected and grouped the
Form D data regarding accredited investors, Tables V-VIII, and financial intermediation, Table IX,
made it practically impossible to use the approximately 27,000 sample used in Tables I-IV
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Table VII shows that these smaller offerings made under Rule 506 are over-
whelmingly limited to accredited investors.
Table VII
Offerings of $1 Million Offerings of $1 Million to
or Less Made Under $5 Million Made Under
Rule 506 and Limited to Rule 506 and Limited to
Accredited Investors Accredited Investors
Percentage 88.3% 91.8%
Number 203/230 191/208
Table VIII combines the information from Tables VI and VII. Table VIII shows
the percentage and number of offerings of $1 million or less that were limited to
accredited investors and the percentage and number of offerings of between $1
million and $5 million that were limited to accredited investors.
Table VIII
All Regulation D Offerings All Regulation D Offerings
of $1 Million or Less Limited of $1 Million to $5 Million
Accredited Investors Limited to Accredited Investors
Percentage 82.4% 88.3%
Number 238/289 204/231
Table VIII shows most vividly the extent to which small businesses searching
for relatively small amounts of external capital limit their search to accredited
investors only
C. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION IN REGULATION D OFFERINGS
Data from our sample of Form Ds provide a final important insight into the ac-
cess to external capital by issuers with limited capital needs. The data demonstrate
the difficulty these small offerings face in attracting financial intermediation-the
professional assistance from brokers or underwriters that issuers need to sell their
securities.
Table IX provides information from our sample showing that in a large majority
of cases, issuers raising small amounts of capital under Regulation D do not use
financial intermediation.4 9
49. Table IX does not show data regarding financial intermediation in Regulation D offerings of
more than $5 million. The author was uncertain about the reliability of the data taken from the Form
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As discussed below, 0 the data in Table IX reflect in their own way the special
need that small entrepreneurs have for regulatory rules that efficiently and fairly
facilitate their access to external capital.
Table IX
Regulation D Offerings of Regulation D Offerings of
$1 Million or Less with $1 Million to $5 Million with
Financial Intermediation Financial Intermediation
Percentage 5.8% 12.7%
Number 18/308 31/244
IV. THE DATA: INTERPRETATIONS, INFERENCES, AND CONCLUSIONS
A. THE UNDERUSE OF RULE 504 AND RULE 505;
LIMITING OFFERINGS To ACCREDITED INVESTORS
The most obvious interpretation of the data in Part III of this article is that
Regulation D has failed to achieve the Commission's goals of providing entrepre-
neurs with relatively small capital requirements a balanced and efficient path to
external capital. Companies able to meet the conditions for the exemptions pro-
vided by Rule 504 or Rule 505-and there are millions of them 51-overwhelmingly
abandon those rules as a basis for meeting their obligations under the 1933 Act.
Instead, the companies elect to comply with the requirements of Rule 506, even
though meeting the conditions of that exemption is more onerous and expensive.
These companies also, once again overwhelmingly, limit their capital search to ac-
credited investors, who amount to a small fraction of the population. 52
The data for offerings of $1 million or less (offerings that should fit under Rule
504) show that 78.6 percent are made under Rule 506, and 82.4 percent are
limited to accredited investors. For offerings of between $1 million and $5 million
Ds on these offerings. Examining the data suggests that a significant percentage of those offerings were
Rule 144A offerings, in which the purchaser from the issuer was purchasing with the view to reselling
into the institutional market. It was uncertain whether in such circumstances the issuer was report-
ing that it paid a commission. Nonetheless, based on the same sample used for Table V1, 13.8 percent
of Regulation D offerings of more than $5 million (62/448) were made with assistance of financial
intermediation.
50. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
52. For example, data from the Internal Revenue Service show that in 2007 only 3.172 percent
of all tax returns reported total annual income of $200,000 or more. See Justin Bryan, High-Income
Tax Returns for 2007, STAT. INCOME BULL., Spring 2010, at 4, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/10sprbulhiinret07.pdf.
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(offerings that should fit under Rule 505), data show that 91.9 percent of those
offerings are made under Rule 506, and 88.3 percent of those offerings are limited
to accredited investors.
B. WHY COMPANIES ABANDON RULE 504 AND RULE 505
AND LIMIT OFFERINGS To ACCREDITED INVESTORS
Typically, companies eligible to use Rule 504 and Rule 505 face tough circum-
stances when they seek external capital. As a result of their size and the small
amounts of capital they seek to raise, their offerings are difficult and expensive.53 Fi-
nancial intermediation is likely to be unavailable, 4 and relative transaction costs for
these companies are high.55 Why, then, would such companies opt out of the ben-
efits of what appear to be lower transaction costs associated with an offering under
Rule 504 or Rule 505 in favor of the apparently higher transaction costs associated
with offerings under Rule 506? And further, why would such companies signifi-
cantly limit the pool of potential investors by offering only to accredited investors?
The most obvious explanation is that altering the terms and techniques of the
offerings in order to meet the requirements of Rule 506 and limiting the offerings
to accredited investors solve the issuers' state securities problems.
Imagine, for example, a small company that proposes to raise $1 million by of-
fering its securities in three states. Meeting the requirements of Rule 504 is rather
simple in that case. Essentially the rule only requires that the issuer engage in no
general advertising and restrict the resale of its securities that are acquired in the
Rule 504 offering." The issuer, however, must also meet the registration require-
ments in each of the three states in which it offers its securities. Thus the issuer
faces three additional, distinct sets of rules respecting the offering of its securities.
It also faces the residual risk that it might inadvertently fail to meet the require-
ments of one of the states, generating significant potential liability
One way to meet its burdens under state laws is for our issuer to restructure
the offering under Rule 506, since NSMIA preempted state authority over Rule
506 offerings."
53. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses' Search for "A Moderate Capital,"
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 88-90 (2006) [hereinafter Campbell, Regulation A] (describing structural and
economic impediments to small business capital formation).
54. See supra Part 1I.B (Table IX).
55. See Campbell, Regulation A, supra note 53, at 89 (describing why offering expenses for small
businesses are "very high").
56. Rule 504 incorporates by reference only sections (a), (c), and (d) of Rule 502. See 17 C.ER.
§ 230.504 (2010). Section (a) of Rule 502 offers a safe harbor from integration; (c) prohibits general
advertising; and (d) imposes restrictions on the resale of securities taken in a Rule 504 offering. Id.
§ 230.502(a), (c)-(d). Recent amendments to the resale provisions of Rule 144 shortened the holding
period for shares taken under Regulation D to six months or one year, depending on the circum-
stances. Id. § 230.144(d)(1)(i-ii). See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Resales of Securities: The New Rules
and the New Approach of the SEC, 37 SEc. REG. L.J. 317, 325-27 (2009) (discussing resales under the
recently amended Rule 144 for shares acquired under Regulation D).
57. Section 18 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (West 2009 & Supp. 2011), preempts state au-
thority over offerings of "covered securities," which term includes securities offered in transactions
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Moving to Rule 506, however, generates additional burdens on the issuer. Most
important, under Rule 506 the issuer is generally required to provide prescribed
disclosures to purchasers, ensure that sales are made only to qualified investors,
and limit its sales to thirty-five purchasers.' These requirements significantly
complicate a Rule 506 offering and raise transaction costs for issuers.
All three of these additional requirements, however, are met if the offering is
limited to accredited investors. Rule 506 imposes no disclosure in connection
with sales to accredited investors.5 9 The purchaser qualification requirements of
the rule are met if purchasers are accredited investors,6 0 and there is no limit on
the number of accredited investors under Rule 506.61
These are the reasons that roughly 80 percent of all offerings in the size range
that would qualify for Rule 504 or Rule 505 are made under Rule 506 and limited
to accredited investors. 62 Issuers rationally conclude that an offering under Rule
506 limited to accredited investors involves lower transaction costs than offerings
under Rule 504 and Rule 505, which are required to meet the registration provi-
sions under each state's blue sky laws.
C. PERNICIOUs EFFECTS
The effective loss of, or material limitation on, the availability of Rules 504 and
505 is pernicious. Although the harm falls most directly on small businesses, the
economy as a whole loses when small businesses are limited in their access to
external capital.
Small businesses are a vital part of our national economy Data available from
the Small Business Administration show, for example, that approximately 18 per-
cent of all employment in the United States is provided by firms with less than
twenty employees, 6 and approximately 36 percent of employment is provided by
firms with less than 100 employees. 4 Thoughtful commentary has opined that
even these numbers understate the importance of small businesses to the vitality
of our national economy."
exempt under "Commission rules or regulations issued under [section 4(2)1" of the 1933 Act. Id.
§ 77r(b)(4)(D).
58. 17 C.ER. H§ 230.506(b)(2), 230.502 (2010).
59. Id. § 230.502(b)(1).
60. Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
61. Id. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv).
62. See supra Part III.A (Tables III & IV); Part IlI.B (Tables VII & VIII).
63. See U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., THE STATE OF SMALL BusiNESs: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 2004, at 178
tbl. A.5 (2004) [hereinafter THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2004] (in 2001, 17.9 percent of all employ-
ment was provided by firms with less than twenty employees); see also THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS
2000, supra note 42, at 61 tbl. A.4 (in 1998, 18.8 percent of all employment was provided by firms
with fewer than twenty employees).
64. See THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2004, supra note 63, at 178 tbl. A.5 (firms of this size in 2001
provided work for 35.6 percent of all employees). In 1998, these firms provided employment for 36.7
percent of all employees. THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 42, at 61 tbl. A.4.
65. See Campbell, Regulation A, supra note 53, at 85-86 (providing data and commentary from
others regarding job creation and innovation by small businesses and minority ownership of small
businesses).
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In securing essential external capital, 66 small businesses face significant im-
pediments. First are the structural or marketplace impediments. No-or very
limited-financial intermediation is available for small offerings. Consider the
data in Table IX, for example, showing that only 5.8 percent of all offerings of $1
million or less are made through brokers or other financial intermediaries. The
reason for this is that small deals by unseasoned issuers generate expenses that
swamp the value created by the transactions. Brokers representing small deals face
the costs of learning the deal, effecting the necessary offers and sales, and absorb-
ing the residual legal risks. Small offerings cannot support such expenses.
The absence of financial intermediation puts these smaller companies at a sig-
nificant disadvantage. The issuers, one might assume, are efficient in their own
business (e.g., making widgets) but not in selling securities. They maintain no
professional staff with the necessary skills to raise capital by selling securities. Pro-
fessors Gilson and Kraakman have written thoughtfully regarding the importance
and efficiencies of financial intermediation. 61
In addition, small businesses' access to external capital is significantly impeded
by state and federal regulatory schemes that discriminate against small entrepre-
neurs. Considered together, federal and state laws and regulations leave small en-
trepreneurs with extremely limited options regarding capital formation activities.
In other articles, I have attempted to demonstrate the limited legal options
available to small issuers." Briefly stated, high offering costs69 generally prevent
small issuers from raising their external capital through registered offerings of
their securities.70 Regulation A offerings have fallen into nearly total disuse,7' due
principally to the impact of state blue sky laws. 72 Offerings under section 4(2)73 are
limited to sophisticated offerees and purchasers74 and apparently require access
66. See id. at 87-89 (providing data and offering explanations for why traditional debt financing is
attractive to small businesses).
67. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549, 613-21 (1984).
68. Earlier writings include The Plight of Small Issuers, supra note 5; The Plight of Small Issuers (and
Others) Under Regulation D, supra note 14; and Regulation A, supra note 53, at 100-12.
69. See, e.g., JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 156 (6th ed. 2009)
(reporting that "estimated 2007 costs for a significant IPO [include] . . . $600,000-$800,000 in fees
to counsel, $500,000-$600,000 for the auditor, underwriter commission of typically 7 percent ....
$150,000-$200,000 in printing costs").
70. See Campbell, Regulation A, supra note 53, at 91-92. SBA data report that between 1988 and
1997, the number of IPOs by small business in those years varied between eighty-three and 304. In
one year, 1999, there were, for example, 101 registered offerings by small businesses. THE STATE OF
SMALL BuSINEss 2000, supra note 42, at 27 tbl. 1.10.
71. See Campbell, Regulation A, supra note 53, at 83 ("from 1995 through 2004" the Commission
received an average of "only about eight Regulation A filings per year").
72. Id. at 106-10.
73. For a good explanation of the common law of section 4(2), see Comm. on Fed. Regulation of
Sec., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Law of Private Placements (Non-Public Offerings) Not Entitled to Benefits of
Safe Harbors-A Report, 66 Bus. LAw. 85 (2010) [hereinafter Law of Private Placements].
74. See id. at 96 ("Courts generally take the view that investors in private placements should have
such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that they are capable of evaluating
the merits and risks of the prospective investment.").
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to or disclosure" of the same information that would be required in a registration
statement.16 The costs of meeting these conditions for the section 4(2) exemption
and, importantly, the residual risk that an offering may not meet these nebulous
requirements make section 4(2) offerings generally unattractive or unworkable
for small issuers seeking external capital. Finally, offerings under the intrastate
exemption provided by Rule 147"7 are restricted to a single state, 8 which inhibits
any broad search for capital. Although within the single state, federal rules permit
an issuer relying on Rule 147 to solicit broadly for investors, 9 coordinating an in-
trastate offering with state blue sky laws will almost certainly foreclose any broad
solicitation, even within the particular state. 0
Facing, as small entrepreneurs do, such difficulties in raising external capital,
the pernicious effects of the loss of or material limitation on the availability of Rule
504 and Rule 505 are exaggerated. When options are so severely limited for this
vital part of our national economy, any loss of an opportunity to access external
capital in a cost efficient way is important.
To its credit, however, the Commission has mitigated the impact of state regula-
tion by maintaining a low threshold for "accredited investor" status. As originally
adopted in 1982, an accredited investor included one with a net worth of $1
million and included one with an annual income of $200,000. Those thresholds
for accredited investor status essentially remained unchanged for nearly thirty
years.8' During that time, of course, inflation's impact and other economic forces
75. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F2d 893, 897 (5th Cir. 1977) ("We hold that in the
absence of findings of fact that each offeree had been furnished information about the issuer that a
registration statement would have disclosed or that each offeree had effective access to such informa-
tion, the district court erred in concluding that the offer was a private placement.").
76. In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-27 (1953), the Supreme Court, in concluding
that the exemption under section 4(2) was not available for Ralston's offering of its securities, stated
that the offerees and purchasers in the transaction "were not shown to have access to the kind of
information which registration would disclose." For a discussion of how courts have interpreted this
statement, see Law of Private Placements, supra note 73, at 103-04.
77. 17 C.ER. § 230.147 (2010).
78. Id. § 230.147(d) (offerees and purchasers must be a resident of the same state in which the is-
suer is incorporated and doing business).
79. The Commission imposes no objection to a wide solicitation, even in cases where the advertise-
ment reaches across state borders. In such interstate advertisements, however, the advertisement must
state that the offering is limited to the state in which the intrastate offering is made. See, e.g., Securities
Act Release No. 33-4434, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 2270, at 2609 (Dec. 6, 1961); see also Maryland
Inn, SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 97 (Jan. 21, 1976) (interstate newspaper adver-
tisements for a Maryland intrastate offering did render Rule 147 unavailable); Master Fin., Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, 11999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,560 (May 27, 1999) (the fact
that an out-of-state resident reads or listens to the advertisement for the intrastate offering does not
disqualify the use of Rule 147).
80. The most likely state exemption relied on for an intrastate offering is the small offering exemp-
tion. See, e.g., UNIF. SEC. AcT § 402(b)(9), 7C U.L.A. 106 (2002) (limiting the offering to ten offerees,
although particular states are likely to have altered the model act provision); see also, e.g., KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 292.410(1)(i)(3)(b)-(c) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010) (limiting the offering to "not
more than fifteen (15) purchasers in Kentucky . . . plus an unlimited number of purchasers who are
accredited investors").
81. The recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act], changed the net worth standards
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significantly increased the number of persons that met one of those standards.
What may be the most vivid way to see the expansionary impact of holding the
accredited investor criteria constant 2 is to consider data from the Internal Rev-
enue Service regarding high income tax returns. Those data show that in 1982,
169,367 returns with adjusted gross income of $200,000 or more were filed,
which amounted to 0.178 percent of all returns. In 2007, the number of returns
with adjusted gross income of $200,000 or more had grown to 4,535,632, or
3.172 percent of all returns."
The impact of the Commission's extremely benign neglect is that small issuers
driven to Rule 506 offerings by burdensome state regulatory schemes have a larger
population of potential investors. As described earlier, small offerings that migrate
to Rule 506 must, as a practical matter, be limited to accredited investors. 4 As a
result, the Commission's sensible inaction of allowing the pool of accredited in-
vestors to expand makes perfect sense. It is a rational, if less than perfect, response
to the pernicious effects of state regulation on small business capital formation.
V. THE PRESCRIPTION
A. HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
State blue sky laws have been the undoing of Regulation D. In order to offer a
sensible remedy for this bad and unintended outcome, it is helpful to consider the
history of the relationship between state and federal regulation of capital forma-
tion.
When Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933, it chose not to preempt
state authority over the offer and sale of securities."' As a result, a public offering
for an accredited investor by excluding from the net worth calculation "the value of the primary resi-
dence" of the investor. Id. § 413(a), 124 Stat. at 1577 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b note). The
effect of this is to raise the threshold for one's accredited investor status under the net worth test of
17 C.ER. § 230.501(a)(6) (2010). The Commission recently sought comments regarding its proposed
implementation of this law. See Net Worth Standards for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release
No. 33-9177, 76 Fed. Reg. 5307 (proposed Jan. 31, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.ER. pts. 230, 239,
270 & 275).
82. Another way to look at the impact of holding the accredited investor definition constant over
the time period is in reference to the change in the consumer price index. For example, SBA data,
using 1982-1984 as the base of 100, calculate the consumer price index for 2008 at 215.2. See U.S.
SMALL Bus. ADMIN., THE STATE OF SMALL BusINESS: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 2009, at 16 tbl. 1.2 (2009)
[hereinafter THE STATE OF SMA.L BUSINESS 20091.
83. See Bryan, supra note 52, at 4. Obviously, this IRS data is not a perfect fit for the accredited
investor criteria of Regulation D. The IRS data report all returns with income of $200,000 or more, not
distinguishing between single and joint returns. Id. Rule 501(a)(6), on the other hand, defines accred-
ited investor to include a person with "an individual [annual] income in excess of $200,000 . . . [or
a] joint income with that person's spouse in excess of $300,000." 17 C.ER. § 230.501(a)(6) (2010).
84. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
85. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. 1, § 18, 48 Stat. 74, 85 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a, 77r).
For a discussion of the history of the relationship between state and federal regulation of securities
offerings, see Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J.
CORP. L. 553, 554-56 (1985); Rutheford B. Campbell,Jr., The Insidious Remnants of State Rules Respect-
ing Capital Formation, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 407, 409-11 (2000) [hereinafter Campbell, The Insidious
Remnants].
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of securities in fifty states, for example, was obliged to meet the laws and regu-
lations of fifty-one separate jurisdictions, each with its own independent, idio-
syncratic rules respecting capital formation. This regulatory result was a wildly
expensive, wasteful,16 and multi-faceted regime that was especially burdensome
and unfair for small issuers, since, as described earlier, small businesses encoun-
tered very high relative transaction costs and generally sought external capital
without financial intermediation."
In the mid-1990s, Congress began looking at this problem. The result was the
introduction of the Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995
(the "Capital Markets Bill")," which would have preempted virtually all state au-
thority over the offer and sale of securities. Essentially, under the Capital Markets
Bill as originally introduced, states were left only with the authority to enforce
state antifraud provisions and to regulate offers and sales of securities offered
under the federal intrastate exemption."
Not surprisingly, this legislative proposal caught the attention of the state
regulators and their organization, the North American Securities Administra-
tors Association ("NASAA"), which offered strong opposition to the legislation.90
Importantly, the SEC effectively refused to take a position on the matter. The
testimony and prepared remarks of then-Chairman Levitt offered during the leg-
islative hearings skillfully dodged any support for broad preemption of state au-
thority over securities offerings.91
As a result, when the bill was finally signed into law as the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996, the preemption, as originally proposed, was
scaled back dramatically 92 With regard to offerings under Regulation D, NSMIA
preempted state authority only over Rule 506 offerings. States preserved their
rights to regulate the sale of securities offered under Rule 504 and Rule 505.11
86. In the legislative hearings that led to NSMIA, then-Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Arthur Levitt, stated: "The current system of dual federal-state regulation is not the
system that Congress-or the Commission-would design today if we were creating a new sys-
tem." Hearing on the Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995 Before the Subcomm.
on Telecomms. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 105 (1995) (statement of Arthur
Levitt).
Nonetheless, Chairman Levitt in those hearings refused to endorse a broad preemption of state
authority of securities offerings. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
88. H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1995).
89. Section 3(a) of the Capital Markets Bill, H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1995), would have allowed
continued state authority over offerings that were exempt from federal registration requirements under
the intrastate exemption. The intrastate exemption is found at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(11) (2006).
90. See Hearing on the Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995 Before the Subcomm.
on Telecomms. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 307 (1995) (statement of Dee R.
Harris, President, North American Securities Administrators Association) ("NASAA is opposed to the
preemption of the state authority to register and review securities offerings.").
91. Id. at 102-31.
92. See Campbell, The Insidious Remnants, supra note 85 (arguing that the impact of state blue sky
laws after NSMIA is both discriminatory against small businesses and substantively unsound).
93. NSMIA preempts state authority over the registration of "covered securities." 15 U.S.C.
§ 77r(b)(1)(A) (2006). "Covered securities" include securities offered by an issuer pursuant to
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This was disastrous for Regulation D and the Commission's balanced regulatory
regime. It is the reason that roughly 80 percent of all offerings that are eligible to
use Rule 504 or Rule 505 are now made, instead, under Rule 506 and limited to
accredited investors. Rule 506 became the overwhelming choice for small issuers
to avoid the dreaded clutches of state regulators.
Apparently, however, even this modest amount of preemption did not sit well
with state regulators and those who favor state control over the registration of
securities.
In 2009-thirteen years after NSMIA preempted state authority over Rule 506
offerings-Senator Christopher Dodd circulated a discussion draft of an approxi-
mately 1,100-page bill, then entitled the Restoring American Financial Stability
Act of 2009 (the "Financial Stability Bill"). 94 This bill would later become the
core of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the
"Dodd-Frank Act"). 95 Buried in Senator Dodd's discussion draft were two provi-
sions having nothing to do with our financial crisis but everything to do with
small business capital formation. The provisions were a double-barreled assault
on NSMIA's preemption of state authority over Rule 506 offerings.
Section 928 of the Financial Stability Bill would have eliminated preemption of
state authority over Rule 506 offerings. 6 Its impact would have been significant,
especially on small businesses seeking external capital.
Consider in that regard data from Tables 1, 111, and IV in Part III of this article.
Table I shows that approximately 12,000 Rule 506 offering are typically made
each year,97 and under the Financial Stability Bill all of those offerings would
have become subject to the regulatory regimes of all fifty states. The impact on
small issuers can be seen in Table III and Table IV Table III shows that on average
small issuers annually make more than 3,500 Rule 506 offerings of $1 million
or less.98 Table IV shows that on average small issuers annually make more than
3,000 Rule 506 offerings of $1 million to $5 million.99 In sum, therefore, nearly
"Commission rules or regulations issued under [section 4(2)]." Id. § 77r(b)(4)(D). Rule 506 was enacted
under the Commission's authority in section 4(2). See 17 C.ER. § 230.506(a) (2010). Securities offered
under the exemption provided by section 3(b) of the 1933 Act are not "covered securities" and thus not
subject to preemption. 15 U.S.C. H§ 77c(b), 77r(b)(1)(A) (2006). Rule 504 and Rule 505 were enacted
under the Commission's authority in section 3(b). See 17 C.FR. §§ 230.504(a), 230.505(a) (2010).
94. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009 (Discussion Draft), S. COMM. ON BANKING,
HOusING & UBRAN AFFAIRs (2009), available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/ files/AYO09D44.
xml.pdf [hereinafter Financial Stability Bill].
95. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 81.
96. The Bill proposed to amend section 18 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77r, by eliminating securi-
ties offered under Rule 506 from inclusion in the definition of "covered securities." Financial Stability
Bill, supra note 94, § 928.
97. Table I shows that over a 26-month period, there were approximately 25,500 Rule 506 offer-
ings. That amounts to slightly less than 1,000 Rule 506 offerings in each month, or approximately
12,000 Rule 506 offerings per year.
98. Table III shows that over a 26-month period, there were 7,880 Rule 506 offerings of $1 million
or less. That amounts to an average of 303 such offerings in each month, or 3,637 such offerings per
year. -
99. Table IV shows that over a 26-month period, there were 7,059 Rule 506 offerings of $1 million
to $5 million. That amounts an average of 271 such offerings each month, or 3,258 such offerings
per year.
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7,000 small offerings per year would have lost the advantage of preemption and
become subject to the regulatory regimes of fifty separate states.
The second prong of the assault on small business capital formation was in sec-
tion 413 of the Financial Stability Bill. It would have required the Commission
to raise both the income standard and net worth standard for accredited investor
status under Regulation D so as to reflect "price inflation since those figures were
determined." 00 Because the net worth standard and the accredited investor stan-
dard go back to 1982,10' a rule that applied an inflation multiple to the standards
would have significantly increased the thresholds and correspondingly reduced
the total pool of investors that meet the criteria.102
Section 413 seemed essentially to be a strategic back-up position designed to
drive small businesses back under state control in the event Congress chose not
to eliminate preemption over Rule 506 offerings. Thus, even if Congress refused
to repeal the preemption over Rule 506 offerings, increasing the accredited inves-
tor thresholds would have effectively limited the number of accredited investors.
With the number of potential investors significantly limited, it was likely that
small businesses would to some degree abandon Rule 506 and return to the utili-
zation of Rule 504 and Rule 505, thereby subjecting their offerings once again to
state regulatory schemes.
Not surprisingly, commentators immediately concluded that state regulators,
acting through NASAA, were behind these provisions designed to eliminate the
preemption effects of NSMIA. 0 3
The strategy was formidable. Small provisions were buried in a huge, com-
plex piece of contentious legislation, making it as a political matter difficult to
eliminate the provisions from the Bill. Also, once again, the proponents correctly
counted on the fact that the Commission would not interject itself into the legisla-
tive fray The Commission, following the same path as it took during the NSMIA
hearings, offered no support in favor of continued federal preemption of Rule 506
offerings.
Notwithstanding the formidable legislative strategy of the proponents, the two
proposals originally in sections 928 and 413 of the Financial Stability Bill es-
sentially were eliminated from the final version of the Dodd-Frank Act that was
signed into law. The Dodd-Frank Act preserved the preemption of state authority
100. The language of the bill was: "The Commission shall, by rule ... increase the financial thresh-
old for an accredited investor . . . by calculating an amount that is greater than the amount in effect
on the date of the enactment of this Act . . . , as the Commission determines is appropriate and in the
public interest, in light of price inflation since those figures were determined . . . ." Financial Stability
Bill, supra note 94, § 412(1). The bill went on to require the Commission to "adjust that threshold not
less frequently than once every 5 years." Id. § 412(2).
101. 17 C.ER. § 230.501(a)(6), (7) (1982).
102. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Scott Edward Walker, A Personal Letter to Senator Dodd Regarding His Anti-Angel
Investment Bill, SAVE REG D (Mar. 31, 2010, 2:53 PM), http://www.saveregd.com/2010/03/personal-
letter-to-senator-dodd.html; Broc Romanek, Dodd Bill Peculiarities: The SEC's Reg D Preemption Gets
Hammered, THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET (Mar. 23, 2010, 9:09 AM), http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/
Blog/2010/03/an-office-of-investor-advocate.html; Bill Carleton & Joe Wallin, Dodd's Attack on Angel
Financing, VENTURE BLOG (Mar. 15, 2010, 1:15 PM), http://techflash.com/seattle/2010/03/congress.
attack-onangeLfinancing.html.
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over Rule 506 offerings.o1 4 With regard to increasing the thresholds for accredited
investor status, the Act made no change in the annual income test but amended
the net worth test to exclude "the value of [the investor's] primary residence." 0
The Act froze the definition of accredited* investor for four years.106
B. REMEDIAL ACTION(S)
The solution to the Regulation D dilemma is simple to articulate. In order to
restore Regulation D to its appropriate place in the governance of small business
capital formation, state authority over all Regulation D offerings must be elimi-
nated. What is not so simple, however, is to identify the rulemaker that is willing
to deal with the matter. It is with regard to this issue that the history of the rela-
tionship between state and federal regulators is important.
There are three possible rulemakers that could eliminate state authority over
capital formation. First, states could surrender their authority over the registra-
tion of securities issued in Regulation D offerings. Second, the Commission could
extend federal preemption through the exercise of its regulatory power. Third,
Congress could extend preemption by the exercise of its legislative power.
What history demonstrates is that not only will states not surrender their au-
thority over registration of Regulation D, but also they-more precisely, state
securities regulators-will fight vigorously to expand their authority over Regula-
tion D offerings and, indeed, over all securities offerings. History also shows that
they are a formidable force, both in terms of their ability to control legislative out-
comes, as they did in the legislation that became NSMIA, and in their willingness
to employ tough political strategies, as they did with the legislation that became
the Dodd-Frank Act. In short, there is little likelihood that states will ever volun-
tarily surrender their authority over Rule 504 and Rule 505 offerings.
The SEC has three options to eliminate state authority over Regulation D offer-
ings. First, the Commission could amend Rule 504 and Rule 505 by changing the
statutory basis for those rules. Rule 504107 and Rule 505108 are based on section
3(b) of the 1933 Act, and NSMIA does not preempt state authority over securi-
ties issued under a regulatory exemption based on section 3(b).109 NSMIA does,
however, preempt state authority over securities offered or sold in a transaction
exempt under "regulations issued under Section 4(2)."10 By amending the basis
104. The Act did impose so-called "bad boy" provisions on Regulation D offerings, which disqual-
ify felons and others engaging in certain types of bad conduct from using Regulation D. Dodd-Frank
Act, supra note 81, § 926, 124 Stat, at 1851 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d).
105. Id. § 413, 124 Stat. at 1577 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b). The Commission recently
proposed regulations to implement this statutory change. Net Worth Standards for Accredited Inves-
tors, Securities Act Release No. 33-9177, 76 Fed. Reg. 5307 (proposed Jan. 31, 2011) (to be codified
at 17 C.ER. pts. 230, 239, 270 & 275).
106. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 81, § 413, 124 Stat. at 1577 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b).
107. 17 C.ER. § 230.504(a)(3) (2010) (offerings meeting the conditions of Rule 504 are "exempt
from the Provisions of section 5 of the Act under section 3(b) of the Act").
108. Id. § 230.505(a) (offerings meeting the conditions of Rule 505 are "exempt from the provi-
sions of section 5 of the Act under section 3(b) of the Act").
109. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r(a)-(b) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011).
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2006).
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for Rule 504 and Rule 505 to make them section 4(2) exemptions, state authority
would be preempted for all offerings under Regulation D.
The second option for the Commission would be to use its delegated authority
under NSMIA to expand preemption. NSMIA preempts state authority over offer-
ings of "covered securities," which include securities offered or sold to "qualified
purchasers, as defined by the Commission.""' The broad breadth of the Commis-
sion's authority to define "qualified purchasers" is made clear by the language of
the statute itself, which limits the Commission's authority only by requiring that
the definition be "consistent with the public interest and the protection of inves-
tors."112 Defining "qualified purchasers" to include purchasers of securities under
Rule 504 and Rule 505 would meet the "public interest" criterion, since NSMIA
itself requires the Commission, when acting in the public interest, to give due
consideration to "capital formation.""'
The final option for the Commission would be to petition Congress for an
expansion of NSMIA's scope to include preemption over securities issued under
regulations enacted under section 3(b) of the 1933 Act."
Regrettably, history shows an unwillingness on the part of the Commission to
act in regard to expanding preemption of state authority over registrations. In
both the legislative actions leading to NSMIA and to the Dodd-Frank Act, the
Commission failed to advocate in favor of preemption.
While one may be sympathetic with the Commission's reluctance to oppose
state regulators-its partners in the battle against securities fraud"'-the Com-
mission's inaction has facilitated the severe damage done to Regulation D by blue
sky laws and the actions of state regulators.
Not only has this inaction hurt small businesses, exacerbating their economic
and structural disadvantages in the capital markets, but also the inaction seems
inconsistent with the congressional delegation of authority under NSMIA. Con-
gress in NSMIA expressed a clear preference for regulations that balance investor
protection with the promotion of capital formation and expressly authorized the
Commission to expand preemption by regulation.'1I It is difficult, at least for me,
111. Id. § 77r(b)(3).
112. Id.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006) requires that "[wihenever ... the Commission engages in rulemak-
ing and is required to consider or determine whether an action is . .. in the public interest, the Com-
mission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation."
114. This would be the preferred solution, since it would also preempt state authority over Regula-
tion A offerings. See Campbell, Regulation A, supra note 53, at 106-10 (discussing the impact of blue
sky laws on the availability of the exemption provided by Regulation A).
115. In a prior article, I wrote about the reluctance of the Commission to expand preemption by
regulation. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption Failure,
22 J. CORP. L. 175 (1997). Without expressing an opinion as to the actual motivation of the Commis-
sion, I offered various explanations for the Commission's inaction (e.g., fear of exceeding its delegated
authority; preference for state rules over its own; failure to recognize the hegemonic realignment ef-
fected by NSMIA). Id. at 207-09.
116. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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to conclude that the Commission, in failing to act to expand preemption, is acting
reasonably with regard to its delegated authority under NSMIA. It has the au-
thority to act by regulation to bring investor protection and promotion of capital
formation back into balance, yet it refuses to act.
Little can be said about the willingness of the third rulemaker, Congress, to ex-
pand preemption. Congress's taste for preemption seems to blow with the political
winds, and it is difficult enough to understand the political winds of today, let
alone predict the winds of the future. What is clear, however, is that the simplest
and most efficient remedy here is a congressional remedy-a revision in NSMIA
to take states entirely out of the regulation of the registration of securities.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Regulation D, the Commission crafted sensible exemptions from the reg-
istration requirements of the 1933 Act. The regulation provided rules that ap-
piopriately and efficiently balanced the need for efficient capital formation with
the need to protect investors, a balance that was later confirmed as obligatory by
federal legislation. Regulation D specifically addressed the special capital forma-
tion needs of small businesses, a large and vital part of our national economy.
State blue sky laws, however, wrecked Regulation D. The data presented in
this article demonstrate that entrepreneurs attempting to raise relatively small
amounts of capital generally fail to avail themselves of the Regulation D rules
specifically designed to meet their special situation.
It now falls to the Securities and Exchange Commission or Congress to take
steps to remedy this situation and reclaim Regulation D.
